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NOTES 
THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO POWER: A Shallow Pocket 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The congressional recess for the Christmas holidays of 19701 has 
acquired a curious legal significance. Shortly before the recess, the 
Family Practice of Medicine Act2 was passed in both houses by nearly 
unanimous votes3 and was presented to President Nixon on Decem-
ber 14, 1970.4 The President neither signed nor returned the bill. 
The Administration maintains that the President's failure to act on 
the measure before the recess has resulted in its absolute veto.Ii 
However, several Congressmen allege that the act was not validly 
vetoed.6 This allegation presents anew the question of the use 
of the pocket veto power. The contours of this power remain un-
certain despite previous Supreme Court attempts to define its consti-
tutional scope.7 
The Constitution 0£ the United States provides three methods 
by which a bill, passed by both houses of Congress and presented to 
the President, may become law and two methods by which such a 
1. The Senate had adjourned from December 22 until December 28 and the House 
of Representatives had adjourned from December 22 until December 29. S. Con. Res. 
87, 116 CONG. R.Ec. S. 21180 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1970); 116 CoNG. R.Ec. D. 1313 (daily ed. 
Dec. 22, 1970). 
2. S. 3418, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
3. It passed the Senate and the House of Representatives by votes of 64-1 and 
346-2, respectively. 116 CONG. R.Ec. S. 15249 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1970); 116 CONG. R.Ec. H, 
10953-54 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1970). 
4. 116 CoNG, R.Ec. S. 21196 (daily ed. Dec. 28, 1970) (remarks of Senator Yar• 
borough). 
5. Letter from Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist to Senator Edward 
M. Kennedy, Dec. 30, 1970, in 116 CONG. R.Ec. S. 21818-19 (daily ed. Jan, 2, 1971) 
[hereinafter Rehnquist Letter]. The President contends that he also pocket vetoed a 
private relief bill presented to him at the same time, H.R. 3571, 91st Cong,, 1st Sess, 
(1969). In April 1971 a claim asserting that this private bill has become law was filed 
with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. See Kass, The Pocket 'Veto: An 
Elusive Bone of Contention, 57 A.B.A.J. 1033, 1035 (1971). This action creates the 
possibility of Supreme Court review of the scope of the pocket-veto power. 
Memoranda expounding the reasons for the President's disapproval of the two bills 
in question are found in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1726-27 (Dec, 
28, 1970). See also text accompanying notes 107-08 infra. 
6. See 116 CoNG. R.Ec. S. 21195-96 (daily ed. Dec. 28, 1970) (remarks of Senators 
Kennedy &: Yarborough); 116 CONG, R.Ec. S. 21817-19 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 1971) (remarks 
of Senator Kennedy); letter from Senator Edward M. Kennedy to Professor Samuel 
D. Estep, Michigan Law School, May 28, 1971, on file with the Michigan Law Review 
[hereinafter Kennedy Letter]; Hearings on the Constitutionality of the President's 
"Pocket 'Veto" Power Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong, 1st Sess. 2-3, 11-12 (1971) (remarks of Senator Ervin and 
Representative Rooney, respectively). 
7. See pt. II. infra. 
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bill would fail to become law.8 One of the procedures resulting in a 
bill's demise is customarily called the "pocket veto." A bill is 
pocket vetoed when, on the tenth day following its presentation to 
the President, he has not signed it but is prevented from returning it 
with his objections to the house in which it originated because 
Congress has adjourned.9 The other type of veto created by the 
Constitution may be termed a "return" veto. This occurs when a 
President disapproves a bill and returns it together with his objec-
tions to the house in which the bill originated.10 The crucial dis-
tinction between the two types of vetoes lies not in the manner in 
which they occur but in their effect upon the bill in question. Al-
though a return veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of each 
house of Congress, a pocket veto is an absolute veto. Once a bill has 
been pocket vetoed by the President, it cannot be returned to the 
house of origin for reconsideration. Therefore, a pocket-vetoed meas-
ure must be resurrected in the form of a new bill if its proponents 
wish it to be again eligible to become law. The exercise of a pocket 
veto thus gives the President far more control over the final status of 
a bill than does the use of a return veto.11 
The Constitution specifies that the pocket-veto power may be 
used only if "Congress by their Adjournment prevent [a bill's] 
Retum."12 A number of ambiguities in this clause have contributed 
to the uncertainty concerning the scope of the President's pocket-
veto power. One such ambiguity concerns the definition of the 
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 describes what may happen to a bill after passage 
by both houses of Congress. It provides in relevant part: 
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; 
If he approves he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections 
to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections 
at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsidera-
tion two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together 
with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, 
and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law .•.• If any 
Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) 
after it shall have been presented him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner 
as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, 
in which Case it shall not be a Law. 
Upon receipt of a bill, the President therefore has ten days excluding Sundays in 
which to examine it. (Further references to the ten-day period in this Note will in-
corporate the exclusion of Sundays). Within that ten-day period, the President may 
sign the bill, veto it, or do nothing. Thus a bill may become law by (1) the President 
signing it within ten days; (2) the Congress overriding a presidential veto by a two-
thirds vote; or (3) the President failing either to sign or return it within ten days when 
Congress is not adjourned. 
9. See note 8 supra. 
10. See note 8 supra. 
11. While it is true that from 1789 through 1968 only 73 of the 1293 return vetoes 
had been overriden, 957 bills had been pocket vetoed without any such possibility. 
PRESIDENTIAL VETOES V (1969). 
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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word "adjournment."13 In its most limited sense, the word could be 
used to denote only the termination of the two-year term of any 
particular Congress.14 Conversely, an adjournment could be said to 
take place at the end of each day that either house of Congress is in 
session. It is unclear, then, which type or types of adjournment were 
meant to create the possibility of a pocket veto. If, for example, an 
adjournment of Congress at the end of each legislative day is con-
strued to "prevent the return" of a bill to the house of its origin, 
the President would obviously have the opportunity to pocket veto 
virtually every bill presented to him, since Congress could prevent 
a pocket veto only by remaining in session until midnight on the 
tenth day after the presentation of a bill to the President. On the 
other hand, the President's power to pocket veto bills would be 
substantially limited if adjournment means that only the close of a 
term of Congress would prevent the return of a disapproved bill to 
the house of its origin. 
A second ambiguity exists because, even given a conclusive defi-
nition of the word adjournment,15 the constitutional language does 
not clearly indicate that every such adjournment would necessarily 
prevent the return of a bill to Congress. Adjournments of the same 
type may differ in length and it may be that the length of an ad-
journment, rather than the type, is the critical factor that would 
prevent a return in the constitutional sense. If, for example, an 
adjournment between sessions of Congress16 was defined to be the 
only type of adjournment that prevents the return of a bill to the 
house of origin, an anomaly would result if a recess within a session 
13. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 63 (4th ed. 195'7) defines "adjournment" as "[a] putting 
off or postponing • • • a session until another time or place; the act of a legislative 
body ... by which the session or assembly is dissolved, either temporarily or finally, 
and the business in hand dismissed from consideration, either definitely or for an in• 
terval." (Emphasis added.) 
14. The Constitution does not establish a specific term for the Congress. However, 
U.S. CONST. art I, § 2 provides that members of the House of Representatives shall be 
chosen every second year. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, as amended by amend. XVII, provides 
that Senators shall be elected for six years and that one third of the Senators shall be 
chosen every second year. From these provisions, tl}e custom of a two-year term of 
Congress has developed. Since Congress is required to meet at least once each year 
(U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 4, as amended by amend. XX, § 2), a term of Congress consists of 
two sessions-one each year. 
15. The constitution uses the words "adjourn" and "Adjournment" in various 
contexts, none of which resolve the question concerning the adjournment to which 
the pocket veto refers. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5 ("smaller Number [than a quorum] may 
adjourn from day to day:" "Neither House ••• shall without the Consent of the other, 
adjourn for more than three days''); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("unless the Congress by 
their Adjournment prevent [a bill's] Return;" "Every Order ••• to which the Con-
currence of the Senate and House ••• may be necessary (except on a question of Ad-
journment) shall be presented to the President''); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("and in 
Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, 
[the President] may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper''). 
16. See note 14 supra. 
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of Congress, during which a return would be permitted, was of 
greater length than an adjournment between sessions. 
A third ambiguity stems from the use of the words "the Con-
gress" in the clause "unless the Congress by their Adjournment pre-
vent [a bill's] Return."17 The apparent import of these words is 
that an adjournment of both houses of Congress is required to pre-
vent a return to the originating house. It is possible, however, that 
"the Congress" should be construed to mean that an adjournment of 
only the house of origin would suffice. The rationale for such an in-
terpretation is a practical one: since the adjournment of the house 
in which a bill did not originate does not in fact prevent its return to 
the originating house, adjournment by the former should not be a 
factor in deciding whether the return has actually been prevented. 
Problems created by the uncertain scope of the President's 
pocket-veto power do not often arise, but neither are they a matter 
of purely academic interest. Indeed, two Senators who have ques-
tioned President Nixon's use of the pocket-veto power18 base their 
challenge on the ambiguous language of the pocket-veto provision. 
They argue that the pocket-veto provision was intended to apply 
only in circumstances involving a final adjournment at the end 
of a term or a session of Congress and was not intended to apply 
to brief adjournments-such as the 1970 Christmas recess-occurring 
within a session of Congress.19 Senator Kennedy contends that the 
President's pocket veto of the Family Practice of Medicine Act is 
invalid and that the bill actually became law on December 25, 1970, 
without benefit of the President's signature, since he failed to return 
it on that date to the Senate with a record of his objections.20 It is 
thus apparent that the unresolved ambiguities in the scope of the 
pocket-veto power may bring into dispute the validity of a measure 
asserted to be law by members of the Congress. When the contrary 
view is taken by the executive branch, a resolution of the ambigu-
ities is required. This Note will examine the circumstances under 
which the President may constitutionally invoke the pocket-veto 
power. 
II. THE JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK 
Only two Supreme Court decisions have considered the issue of 
the type or length of adjournment that will prevent the return of a 
bill to Congress. The Pocket Veto Case21 was the first Supreme 
17. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 7. 
18. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. 
19. See letter from Senator Edward M. Kennedy to Attorney General John N. 
Mitchell, Dec. 29, 1970, in 116 CONG. R.Ec. S. 21818 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 1971). 
20. See Kennedy Letter, supra note 6. 
21, 279 U.S. 655 (1929). 
152 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70:148 
Court decision to delineate at least partially the constitutional scope 
of the presidential pocket-veto power. The House of Representatives 
had adjourned sine die22 at the end of the first session of the 
Sixty-ninth Congress on July 3, 1926, while on the same date, the 
Senate had adjourned to a date certain.23 A bill originating in the 
Senate24 had passed both houses and had been presented to President 
Coolidge on June 24, 1926. On the tenth day thereafter (July 6), 
neither house was in session. Presented with these facts the Supreme 
Court had to decide whether the adjournment of both houses on 
July 3 prevented the return of the bill within ten days and thus 
resulted in a lawful pocket veto, or whether the bill had become 
law since the President had neither signed nor returned it to the 
Senate. The unanimous holding of the Court was that if, as a 
result of a sine die adjournment at the end of the first session, Con-
gress is not sitting on the last day of the ten-day period allowed the 
President before he must return a bill, he has been "prevented" from 
returning the bill to the house in which it originated.2 i; In other 
words, it is not only the final adjournment of a term of Congress 
that brings the pocket-veto provision into effect but also a final ad-
journment of a session of Congress.26 
In reaching this decision, the Court was concerned that the 
President should have the full ten-day period in which to decide 
whether a bill should be approved or disapproved and, if the latter, 
to formulate his objections for consideration by the Congress. The 
Court attributed the pocket veto, not to the President's inaction, 
but to the action of Congress in adjourning before the expiration of 
the ten days allowed the President to return the bill.27 The Court 
22. An adjournment sine die is literally an adjournment "without day." It is used 
by both houses of Congress to mean a final adjournment at the close of either a session 
or a term of a house and should be distinguished from an adjournment to a date 
certain, a phrase used to denote an adjournment for a limited period of time within 
a session of Congress. An adjournment to a date certain, by definition, can never be 
used to close either a session or term of Congress. 
23. 67 CONG. REc. pt. 11, at 12770, 12885, 13009, 13018, 13100 (1926). By the terms 
of H. Con. Res. 39, the House adjourned sine die and the Senate adjourned until 
November 10, 1926-the date to which, sitting as a court of impeachment, it had previ• 
ously adjourned for the trial of certain articles of impeachment. 67 CoNG. Rr:c. pt. 8, 
at 8733 (1926). On that date, the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, met and ad-
journed sine die. 68 CONG. REc. pt. 1, at 3-4 (1926). Despite the fact that the Senate's 
reconvening on November IO was still within the first session of the 69th Congress, the 
Court stated in the Pocket Veto Case: "That the adjournment on July 3 was in effect an 
adjournment of the first session of the Congress is not' questioned." 279 U.S. at 672 n.l. 
Thus, the Court treated both houses of Congress as having adjourned sine die on July 
3, 1926. 
24. S. 3185, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926). 
25. 279 U.S. at 691-92. 
26. In so holding, the Court rejected the position of the Committee on the Judiciary 
of the House of Representatives that only the final adjournment of a term of Congress 
would engage the pocket-veto provision. See 279 U.S. at 667, 680. 
27. [I]t is plain that when the adjournment of Congress prevents the return of 
a bill within the allotted time, the failure of the bill to become a law cannot 
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explicitly rejected the argument that, despite an adjournment at 
the end of a session, the President may still have the full ten-day 
period in which to consider a bill because the bill might be returned 
to the house of its origin, although not in session, by delivery to an 
officer or agent of that house who could hold the bill and deliver it 
when the house resumed its operations at the next session.28 The 
Court noted the delay in reconsideration of a vetoed bill that such 
a scheme would entail and commented that, until the house recon-
vened, a bill delivered to a congressional officer or agent would be 
kept "in a state of suspended animation."29 The Court concluded 
that such a method of return "would not comply with the constitu-
tional mandate"30 and "that the return of the bill should be an actual 
and public return to the House itself, and not a fictitious return by a 
delivery of the bill to some individual."31 Thus, a house adjourning 
sine die at the end of a session of Congress was held by the Court 
to be physically unable to receive the return of a bill disapproved 
by the President. 
The only other Supreme Court case that considered the scope 
of the pocket-veto power was Wright v. United States.32 Wright con-
cerned a bill33 that had originated in the Senate and was presented 
to President Roosevelt on April 24, 1935. On May 4, the Senate 
recessed until May 7.34 On May 5, the ninth day after the bill had 
been presented to the President, he returned it with his objections 
to the Secretary of the Senate. Both the bill and the President's 
objections were presented to the Senate by its secretary when the 
Senate reconvened on May 7-the eleventh day after the bill had 
been presented to the President.35 
Petitioner contended that since the bill had not been returned 
to the Senate until the eleventh day, it had become law without 
benefit of the President's signature. In rejecting this argument, the 
Court noted that the Constitution neither expressly defines the re-
quirements for the valid return of a bill nor "den[ies] the use of 
properly be ascribed to the disapproval of the President-who presumably 
would have returned it before the adjournment ·if there had been sufficient time 
in which to complete his consideration and take such action-but is attributable 
solely to the action of Congress in adjourning before the time allowed the Presi-
dent for returning the bill had expired. 
279 U.S. at 678-79. 
28. 279 U.S. at 683-84. 
29. 279 U.S. at 684. 
30. 279 U.S. at 684. 
31. 279 U.S. at 685. 
32. 302 U.S. 583 (1938). 
33. S. 713, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1936). 
34. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 allows either house to adjourn for not more tban 
three days within a session of Congress without the consent of the other J:louse, 
35. See 302 U.S. at 585, 
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appropriate agencies in effecting the return."30 The Court thus 
concluded that there are no constitutional barriers to the accomplish-
ment of a return by delivery to the secretary or clerk of the house 
of origin if it is engaged in a recess of no more than three days.87 
In both the Pocket Veto Case and the Wright case, the Court 
considered the practical difficulties posed by allowing the return 
of a bill to an agent of a house.38 The Wright Court concluded that 
if a house has recessed for a maximum of three days, no practical 
difficulties result if a bill is returned to the house's agent.80 The 
Court noted that during a recess of such brevity the organization of 
the Senate con~inues intact, the Secretary of the Senate is function-
ing and able to receive the bill, and since the membership will 
reassemble within three days it can act upon the President's objec-
tions with reasonable promptness.40 It also noted the familiar practice 
of presenting a bill to the President during his temporary absence 
by sending it to the White House to be held by a clerk until his 
return, and concluded that allowing a congressional agent to hold a 
returned bill for no more than three days pending the reconvening of 
the house in which the bill originated creates no greater difficulty.41 
The Court dismissed the proposition that the practical difficulties 
of a return to an agent of a house during a three-day recess should 
preclude the possibility of such a return. The Court realized that, 
if an argument to that effect was accepted, Congress would be denied 
the opportunity to pass a bill over the President's objections. The 
latter construction would "ignore the plainest practical considera-
tions and by implying a requirement of an artificial formality ... 
[would] erect a barrier to the exercise of a constitutional right."42 
However, in so holding, the Wright Court was careful to distinguish 
the facts presented to it from the facts of the Pocket Veto Case. The 
dangers envisioned in the Pocket Veto Case of a vetoed bill languish-
ing in the possession of an agent of either house for "days, weeks or 
perhaps months" between the two sessions of the same Congress43 
were conceded by the Wright Court to have existed in the limited 
context of that earlier case.44 But in the situation presented in 
Wright, those dangers were dismissed as "illusory."4G 
36. 302 U.S. at 589. 
37. 302 U.S. at 598. 
38. 279 U.S. at 684-85; 302 U.S. at 589-90. 
39. 302 U.S. at 589. 
40. 302 U.S. at 589-90. 
41. 302 U.S. at 590. 
42. 302 U.S. at 590. 
43. 279 U.S. at 684. 
44. 302 U.S. at 595. 
45. When there is nothing but such a temporary recess the organization of the 
House and its appropriate officers continue to function without interruption, 
the bill is properly safeguarded for a very limited time and is promptly reported 
and may be reconsidered immediately after the short recess is over. • • • If we 
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III. THE "GRAY AREA" (ILLUMINATED) 
As observed by Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehn-
quist, "there is undoubtedly a legal 'gray area' with respect to the 
question reserved in the Wright case-whether a pocket veto is 
appropriate during an adjournment for more than three days by 
one House of Congress."46 It is submitted, however, that the legal 
effect of a pocket veto when both houses have recessed for longer 
than three days within a session of Congress-the factual setting of 
President Nixon's pocket veto of the Family Practice of Medicine 
Act47-is similarly unresolved by either Wright or the Pocket Veto 
Case. 
The Assistant Attorney General concluded that because the ten-
day period in which the President could exercise a return veto had 
expired during the congressional Christmas recess, when both the 
Senate and House of Representatives had adjourned for longer than 
three days, "the President was on very firm legal ground" in exer-
cising a pocket veto.48 It is his opinion that the general rule re-
garding the use of the pocket veto is stated in the Pocket Veto Case 
while the Wright decision is an "exception to that general rule," 
which "is to be confined to the fact situation there presented."49 
In fact, the Wright Court reserved the questions of the effect 
of an adjournment of a single house or of both houses for periods 
longer than three days.60 The decision of the Court to follow the 
common judicial practice of limiting a holding to the specific facts 
of the case before it51 does not mean, however, as the Assistant 
Attorney General seems to infer, that the Pocket Veto Case becomes, 
by default, the statement of the general rule. Indeed, the Pocket 
Veto Case was also considered by the Wright Court to be specifically 
limited to its particular facts. 52 The holding of neither case is 
regard the manifest realities of the situation, we cannot fail to see that a brief 
recess by one House, such as is permitted by the Constitution without the consent 
of the other House, during the session of Congress, does not constitute such an 
interruption of the session of the House as to give rise to the dangers which, as 
the Court [in the Pocket Veto Case] apprehended, might develop after the 
Congress has adjourned. 
302 U.S. at 595-96. 
46. Rehnquist Letter, supra note 5, at S. 21819 (emphasis added). 
47. See note 1 supra. 
48. Rehnquist Letter, supra note 5, at S. 21819. 
49. Id. at S. 21819. 
50. [W]hile a recess of one House is limited fhere] to three days without the con-
sent of the other House, cases may arise in which the other House consents to an 
adjournment and a long period of adjournment may result. We have no such case 
before us and we are not called upon to conjecture as to the nature of the action 
which might be taken by the Congress in such a case or what would be its 
effect. 
302 U.S. at 598. 
51. See, e.g., Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 
U.S. 33, 39 (1885). 
52. The question [in the Pocket Veto Case] was whether the concluding clause 
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authority for the Nixon Administration's assertion that a pocket 
veto is lawful if, on the tenth day following the presentation of 
a bill to the President, both houses of Congress have recessed for 
more than three days but have not adjourned sine die at the end 
of a session or term. Between the three-day recess, when a pocket 
veto is impermissible, and an adjournment sine die concluding 
a session, when a pocket veto may constitutionally operate, lies 
the "gray area" of the legal scope of the pocket veto. Within this 
unsettled area, three distinct situations could occur, each of which 
would bring the constitutionality of a pocket veto into question. 
Dispute might occur if a President took no action on a bill and the 
ten-day period for returning it expired while: (I) one house was in 
session but the house in which the bill originated had taken a recess 
of more than three days; (2) both houses were in a recess of more 
than three days; or (3) the house in which the bill originated was in 
session but the other house had taken a recess of more than three 
days. The constitutionality of a pocket veto in each of these situations 
must be examined if a rational rule governing the use of the pocket-
veto power is to be formulated. 
A. Recess of House of Origin 
If the house in which a bill originates is in a recess of longer than 
three days on the tenth day after the bill has been presented to the 
President, it may be contended that the President's inaction results 
in a pocket veto of the bill because such a recess constitutes an "ad-
journment" that prevents the bill's return. On the other hand, the 
assertion that the bill has become law would rest on the argument 
that, under the reasoning of Wright, the President could have de-
livered a return veto on the tenth day to the secretary or clerk of 
the house of origin;53 since a return was not made, the bill has 
become law. This situation is thus identical to the facts of Wright1H 
except that the length of the adjournment of the house in which the 
bill originated has here been extended beyond the three days a house 
may recess without the consent of the other house.61; 
Whether a pocket veto in this circumstance would be effective 
depends upon the interpretation given the pocket-veto provision. 
Any such interpretation must consider both the explicit language 
of Paragraph 2 of § 7 of Article I was limited to a final adjournment of the Con• 
gress or embraced an adjournment of the Congress at the close of the first regular 
session .••• The Court did not decide, and there was no occasion for ruling, that 
the clause applies where the Congress has not adjourned and a temporary recess 
has been taken by one House during the session of Congress. Any observations 
which could be regarded as having a bearing upon the question now before us 
would be taken out of their proper relation. 
302 U.S. at 593 (emphasis original). 
53. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra. 
54. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra. 
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
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and the underlying purpose of that provision. 56 The first question 
presented is whether the literal demand of the Constitution is satis-
fied. Did "the Congress by their Adjoumment"57 prevent the return 
of the bill? The Supreme Court held in Wright, in which only the 
Senate had adjourned, that "'the Congress' did not adjourn .... 
[T]he Senate is not 'the Congress.' " 58 This same argument would 
be applicable here, and leads to the conclusion that the adjournment 
to a date certain by only one house, for any length of time, can never 
be an adjournment that prevents the return. This view would carry 
special weight because the Court in Wright, after noting the "precise 
use of terms and careful differentiation" in Article I, concluded that 
the language in question 
describes not an adjournment of either House as a separate body, 
or an adjournment of the House in which the bill shall have origi-
nated, but the adjournment of "the Congress." It cannot be supposed 
that the framers of the Constitution did not use this expression with 
deliberation or failed to appreciate its plain significance. The refer-
ence to the Congress is manifestly to the entire legislative body con-
sisting of both Houses. Nowhere in the Constitution are the words 
"the Congress" used to describe a single House. 59 
The Wright Court warned, however, against arguments of "ex-
tremely technical character."60 Although the proposition that an 
adjournment of only the house of a bill's origin is not an adjourn-
ment of Congress was clearly considered in Wright to be of sub-
stantive import, a future Court might regard the argument as a 
technicality that should not be the basis for a constitutional deci-
sion. Such a view could be justified by reasoning that, if the meaning 
of the word "adjournment" in the pocket veto provision is so ill-
defined, 61 the meaning of the term "Congress" may be equally un-
certain. Consequently, while the use of the words "the Congress" 
militates against a decision that an adjournment by only one house 
allows a pocket veto, the language alone does not absolutely require 
such a conclusion. 
The purposes underlying the creation of the pocket veto must 
also be considered in resolving the problem. The Supreme Court 
has concluded that a construction of the pocket-veto clause should 
not be adopted which would frustrate either of the following 
56. "Like most of the Constitution, the simple words of the controlling clause 
[art. I, § 7, cl. 2] carry the interpretation part way but do not automatically unlock all 
the doors. The ultimate solution must, as so often, be sought through the principles 
behind the language." Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624, 
627 (Ct. Cl. 1964). 
57. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, the relevant part of which is set out in note 8 supra. 
58. 302 U.S. at 587. 
59. 302 U.S. at 587-88. 
60. 302 U.S. at 597. 
61. See note 15 supra. 
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purposes served by that provision: (I) that the President shall have 
the opportunity to consider all bills presented to him for a full 
ten days; (2) that the Congress shall have the opportunity to consider 
and pass over the President's objections bills that he has disap-
proved. 62 A determination that the President may return a vetoed 
bill to an authorized agent of a house that has recessed for longer 
than three days would serve these purposes and be consistent with 
Wright.63 An unreturned bill would thus become law, "in like 
manner as if [the President] had signed it."64 A contrary determina-
tion, however, would prevent the Congress from considering the 
President's objections and would eliminate any opportunity for 
Congress to override the veto. Such a consequence, which would 
frustrate a "fundamental purpose"65 of the pocket-veto provision, 
should be tolerated only if considerations of greater magnitude 
would be served thereby. The only consideration suggested by the 
existing case law that would support such an outcome is the fear to 
which the Court in the Pocket Veto Case alluded, that, during a 
sine die adjournment, unacceptable dangers would exist if a vetoed 
bill was returned to a congressional agent. The perceived dangers 
were that no legislative record would be made either of the return 
of the bill itself or of the President's objections, that there would be 
questions about the date of the bill's return or whether a return had 
been made at all, and that congressional reconsideration of the bill 
would be delayed.66 However, the Wright Court felt that even though 
such dangers might exist "when Congress has adjourned and the 
members of its Houses have dispersed at the end of a session . . . 
they appear to be illusory when there is a mere temporary recess."67 
It therefore concluded that the need for Congress to be able to over-
ride a veto outweighed the dangers. The Court in the Pocket Veto 
Case had reached a contrary conclusion. To resolve the scope of the 
pocket-veto power within the gray area, then, it must be determined 
whether a recess during a session of Congress of longer than three 
62. Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 486 (1932). This case held that a bill 
signed by the President within ten days after it was presented to him, even though 
signed after a sine die adjournment of the Congress that passed it, nevertheless be• 
came law. See text accompanying notes 97-99 infra. The Court, in making its judgment, 
gave weight to "the fundamental purpose of the constitutional provision" in question. 
The reference was, of course, to the concluding sentence of U.S. CONST. art, I, § 7, cl, 
2. 286 U.S. at 486, 493. Since the same sentence must be examined to analyze the 
presidential pocket-veto power, the Edwards Court's observations regarding that pro• 
vision's purpose are relevant to this discussion. The Wright Court, citing Edwards, 
restated these dual considerations and concluded, "We should not adopt a construction 
which would frustrate either of these purposes." 302 U.S. at 596, 
63. See text accompanying notes 39-42 supra. 
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
65. See note 62 supra. 
66. 279 U.S. at 684. 
67. 302 U.S. at 595. 
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days, by the house in which a bill originated, constitutes such an in-
terruption of the session of that house as to give rise to dangers that 
would outweigh the mandate that Congress be given an opportunity 
to override presidential vetoes. There are three possible outcomes 
to the balancing of these competing considerations. 
The first possible outcome would be a decision that the dangers 
of requiring a President to return a bill to an agent of the house of 
origin, when that house is in a recess of longer than three days, out-
weigh the desirability of allowing Congress the opportunity to over-
ride the presidential veto. Consequently, a recess of such length by 
the house of origin would "prevent" the President from returning a 
bill. If he did not sign it within ten days after receivng it, a lawful 
pocket veto would result. This decision would be consistent with 
Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist's view that Wright is an excep-
tion to the general rule of the Pocket Veto Case.fl8 The weakness 
of this position, however, is that it fails to recognize that the critical 
factor in deciding whether a pocket veto is permissible during a 
recess within a session of Congress is not the length of the recess, but 
rather the length of that segment of the recess that extends beyond 
the tenth day after a bill has been presented to the President. The 
practical effect of Wright was a determination that the Clerk of 
the House or the Secretary of the Senate can constitutionally 
receive a bill from the President if the bill's house of origin will 
reassemble within three days. No different result should be reached 
when the return will be to an agent of the originating house-which 
is in a recess with a total length of greater than three days-so long 
as the house is likewise to reassemble within three days of the Presi-
dent's return of the bill. The failure to make this distinction is 
a weakness that may be illustrated as follows: On Thursday, April 
l, 1971, two bills are presented to the President, each of which he 
lisapproves. One bill originated in the Senate, the other in the House 
of Representatives. If neither house recessed, the President would 
have ten days in which to return the bills with his objections to the 
respective house of origin or each would become law without his 
signature. However, on Friday, April 2, the Senate, with the consent 
of the House, adjourns for twelve days until Wednesday, April 14. 
The House, meanwhile, takes a three-day recess on Monday, April 
12, to reconvene on Thursday, April 15. The President neither signs 
nor returns either bill to the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of 
the House by Tuesday, April 13-the tenth day after their presenta-
tion to him. What is the consequence of his inaction? According to 
Wright, a lawful return veto could have been made of the House bill 
to the Clerk of the House on Tuesday, April 13. The Clerk would 
68. See Rehnquist Letter, supra note 5, at S. 21819. 
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then have held the bill for two days until the House reassembled on 
Thursday, April 15. Since the President did not return the House 
bill, it would have become law. The Senate bill, however, would have 
been validly pocket vetoed because the Senate would have been in a 
recess of longer than three days on the tenth day after its bill had 
been presented to the President. A return veto to the Secretary of 
the Senate on Tuesday, April 13, would not have been permissible 
even though the Secretary would have had to safeguard the bill for 
only one day until the Senate reconvened. This anomalous conse-
quence, that the agent of one house might be allowed to hold a 
bill for two days but the agent of the other house might not be 
allowed to hold a bill for only one day, demonstrates the weakness of 
distinguishing between recesses of three days and those of longer 
duration. This result fails to make the subtle but important distinc-
tion between the total length of an adjournment and the number of 
days that the congressional agent must hold the bill. For this reason, 
it should not be adopted. 
The second possible outcome would eliminate this anomaly by 
permitting the President to return the bill to an agent of the house 
of origin if the recess is to end within three days, irrespective of the 
total length of the recess. It would reflect a decision that the dangers 
of allowing an agent to hold a bill for three days are not sufficient 
to outweigh the need for congressional opportunity to override a 
presidential veto, but that the dangers of permitting an agent to hold 
a bill for more than three days are sufficient to outweigh that need. 
This outcome would be open to the criticism that there is no special 
magic in the choice of a three-day period; if the clerk may safeguard 
a bill for three days, why not for four or five or any other number 
of days? The establishment of a "rule of reason" has been suggested 
as a solution for this problem.00 Under this approach, the determina-
tion whether the dangers of delay should prevent a return to a con-
gressional agent would be made on the particular facts of each pocket 
veto that was challenged. This proposal would itself create an addi-
tional danger, however: it would put in doubt the legal validity, 
pending actual judicial application of the "rule of reason," of every 
bill that was pocket vetoed by a President during a recess by the 
house of origin that was to last more than three days beyond the tenth 
day after the bill had been presented to the President. The un-
certainty created would outweigh any advantages inhering in the 
adoption of such a "rule of reason." 
Finally, the third outcome would suggest that the holding of 
the Pocket Veto Case should be strictly limited to its facts and 
that the rationale of Wright should be extended to include all re-
cesses of any length occurring within a session of Congress. The 
69. 116 CoNG. REC. S. 21818 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 1971) (remarks of Senator Kennedy). 
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dangers of allowing a congressional agent to hold a bill for longer 
than three days realistically are not great and thus do not outweigh 
the need for Congress to be able to override presidential vetoes. It 
would appear that the fear expressed in the Pocket Veto Case-that 
if the return of a bill could be made to an agent of the house of 
origin, there might be "no certain knowledge on the part of the pub-
lic as to whether it had or had not been seasonably delivered"70-is 
now, with the widespread dissemination of news by radio and televi-
sion, no longer persuasive. Contemporary media can easily inform the 
public when the President returns a bill. Further, today (and quite 
possibly in 1929, the year in which the Pocket Veto Case was de-
cided) there should be no concern about the physical safety of a bill 
or the ability of the congressional staff or leadership to inform 
promptly all members of Congress of the return of a bill. The objec-
tion that a bill returned during a recess would be in a state of 
"suspended animation"71 is likewise not persuasive since even a re-
turn veto transmitted to a house in actual session is not assured 
instantaneous reconsideration; such a bill may be tabled, sent to com-
mittee, or acted upon in the same slow fashion as other measures.72 
If, for some reason, immediate reconsideration of a returned bill is 
desired, Congressmen can now reassemble in Washington within 
hours. In addition, the Supreme Court has read as one of the con-
trolling purposes of the pocket-veto provision "that the status of 
measures shall not be held indefinitely in abeyance through inaction 
on the part of the President."13 This suggests a greater concern with 
presidential inaction than with congressional delay in reconsidera-
tion. 
This final outcome presents the most felicitous balance be-
tween the dangers of a bill's languishing in the hands of a con-
gressional agent and the need to protect congressional prerogatives. 
In the first hypothetical situation involving a presidential veto in 
the gray area-when only the house of origin has adjorned for more 
than three days-the conclusion is compelled that the President, 
having chosen not to sign the bill, should be required to return the 
bill to an agent of that house. If he fails to make a return within the 
ten days allotted him, the bill would become law "as if he had signed 
it." 
B. Recess of Both Houses 
In the second hypothetical situation, both houses of Congress are 
in a recess of more than three days on the tenth day after a bill 
70. 279 U.S. at 684. 
71. 279 U.S. at 684. 
72. See CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRE· 
SENTATIVES 38 (1953). 
73. Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 486 (1932) (emphasis added). 
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has been presented to the President. The obvious distinction between 
this situation and the first is that here, since neither house is in 
session, there can be no dispute that "the Congress" has adjourned. 
This constitutional requirement having been fulfilled, there still 
remains the question whether such an adjournment "prevents" the 
return of a bill to the house of origin and thereby permits the exercise 
of the pocket-veto power. This question can be resolved by resort 
to the same balancing process utilized earlier. Since the house in 
which the bill originated must override a President's veto by a two-
thirds vote before the other house may reconsider it, 74 determining 
whether the President is prevented from returning a bill to the 
originating house should in no manner be dependent upon whether 
the other house is also in a recess of more than three days. The 
balancing process thus operates in the same factual context as 
previously discussed-the adjournment ,of only the house of origin 
for more than three days. The conclusion follows that a return to an 
agent of the house of origin is again permissible; and again the Presi-
dent would be denied an opportunity to exercise the pocket-veto 
power. 
C. Recess of Non originating House 
The third possible adjournment posture of the Congress exists 
when the house in which the bill originated is in session on the tenth 
day after the bill has been submitted to the President, but the other 
house has recessed for more than three days. It is difficult to imagine 
any reason that could be offered to explain why the President should 
not be required to return a disapproved bill to the originating house. 
"The Congress" has not adjourned and the adjournment of the non-
originating house does not prevent a physical return of the bill for 
reconsideration by the house of origin. Accordingly, the President 
should not be permitted to pocket veto a bill under these circum-
stances. 
Even the holding of the Pocket Veto Case,76 concurred in 
by Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist, 76 would appear to approve 
this conclusion since the house of origin is in session and able to 
receive a return veto. Consider, however, the practical consequences 
of the following: it is possible that the returned bill could be im-
mediately reconsidered and approved by a two-thirds vote of the 
originating house. If this occurs, the Constitution provides that the 
bill "shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, 
by which it shall likewise be reconsidered."77 Since the "other House" 
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 
75. See text accompanying note 25 supra. 
76. See text accompanying note 49 supra. 
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
November 1971] Notes 163 
has recessed for an unspecified length of time greater than three 
days, what is to be done with the bill until the other house reas-
sembles? Obviously the bill could be held by the clerk of the 
originating house and submitted to the other house upon its return, 
or it might be conveyed immediately to an agent of the other house 
for safekeeping uri.til that body reconvenes. In either case, it is un-
avoidable that if a return veto is immediately overriden by the house 
of origin, the bill must be kept, by an agent of one house or the 
other, in a state of "suspended animation" for "days, weeks, or per-
haps months"78 until the other house reconvenes. 
The third adjournment hypothetical thus contains the same po-
tential dangers of a bill remaining in the hands of a congressional 
agent that existed in the first two situations. From his support of the 
principle implicit in the Pocket Veto Case-that a presidential veto 
may only be made by a return if the house of origin is actually in 
session-it would appear that Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist 
would allow the house of origin to receive a presidential return veto 
even though the other house had recessed for more than three days. 
By accepting this proposition, he accepts as well the potential dangers 
that he was not ·willing to accept when it was the house of origin that 
had adjourned, either alone or concurrently with the other house. 
If, therefore, his construction of the pocket-veto provision were 
adopted, it would be possible for bills to languish in the hands of a 
congressional agent in the third adjournment situation but not in 
the first two. In the interpretation urged by this Note, however, the 
treatment of vetoed bills would be consistent, regardless of which 
house was in recess-it would be clearly acknowledged that the Clerk 
of the House and the Secretary of the Senate have full authority to 
receive bills during recesses by their respective houses of any length 
occurring within a session of Congress. This would mean that the 
President would not be able to pocket veto a bill in any possible 
factual situation falling within the gray area. The Wright holding 
thus would be the statement of the general rule governing the use of 
the pocket veto, with the Pocket Veto Case the only exception. 
D. The Extension of Wright 
It might be argued that such an extension of Wright essentially 
undercuts the foundation of the Pocket Veto Case. This argument 
would rest on tw'O grounds. First, to deny the possibility of a pocket 
veto under the facts of any of the three possible adjournment situa-
tions in the gray area would ignore the warning-s expressed in the 
Pocket Veto Case about the inherent dangers of allowing a vetoed 
bill to remain pending for long periods of time without the possi-
78. The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 684 (1929). 
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bility of reconsideration by one or both houses.70 Second, if Wright 
is extended as suggested, the importance placed on timely recon-
sideration of a returned bill would be diminished and consideration 
of a vetoed bill would be regarded with no greater urgency than that 
accorded any other piece of legislation. And, since all legislative 
business in both houses is carried over from one session of Congress 
to the next "as if no adjournment had taken place,''80 the ultimate 
extension of the reasoning of Wright would be to overrule the Pocket 
Veto Case and to allow the consideration of vetoed bills to be carried 
over into the next session. 
Two arguments may be made, however, either of which would 
support the extension of Wright. The first is that the Pocket Veto 
Case should indeed be overruled. This conclusion would suggest that 
the balancing previously used to justify return to the Secretary 
of the Senate or the Clerk of the House when either or both bodies 
were in a recess of more than three days would have the identi-
cal result if applied to the facts of the Pocket Veto Case. Specifically, 
improvements in communications, security, and recordkeeping in 
the forty years since the Pocket Veto Case suggest that even sine die 
adjournments by either or both houses at the end of the first session 
of Congress should no longer "prevent" the return of a bill to the 
permanent congressional staff. With the increased workload of 
Congress since 1926, the length of each session has expanded to the 
point that a bill returned at the close of one session might be re-
considered at the start of the next with a delay of only a month or 
two.81 
The second argument would allow the Pocket Veto Case to stand, 
despite an extension of Wright to all recesses of any length occurring 
within a session of Congress. This argument was not considered in 
the Pocket Veto Case, but it is a rationale upon which that case 
might rest. The initial sentences of the section in the Constitution 
that contains the pocket-veto provision are concerned with the pro-
cedure for overriding return vetoes. If the President does not ap-
prove a bill, 
he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall 
have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their 
Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. I£ after such Reconsideration 
two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, 
together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall 
79. 279 U.S. at 684. 
80. SENATE MANUAL, Standing Rule XXXII, at 43 (1967); CoNSflTUTION, JEFFERSON'S 
MANUAL AND Ruu:s OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Rule XXVI, at 471 (1953). 
81. The sine die adjournment by the House of Representatives in the Pocket 
Veto Case occurred on July 3, 1926. By contrast, the first session of the 91st Congress 
adjourned sine die on December 23, 1969. 
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likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that 
House, it shall become a Law.82 
The final sentence of the section explains that a pocket veto of 
a bill is to occur when "the Congress by their Adjournment prevent 
its Return."83 It is submitted that the second inclusion of the word 
"return" was meant to incorporate the same procedures for the 
overriding of a presidential veto that follow the first use of the word 
"return." The concluding phrase should thus be construed practically 
to read: "unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its 
Return, for such Reconsideration by each House, in which Case 
it shall not be a Law." The significance of this construction is that, 
given the facts of the Pocket Veto Case (session adjournment of both 
houses of Congress), the word "prevent" would not mean a physical 
prevention of "return" because the house of origin was not in ses-
sion to receive such return-the interpretation adopted by that 
Court. Instead, "prevent" would mean a prevention of reconsidera-
tion because the house in which the bill originated had ended its 
legally constituted legislative session.84 This reasoning may seem 
to lead to an improper conclusion because the life of Congress does 
not end with the adjournment of the first session; it would appear 
that a returned bill could be reconsidered after the Congress recon-
venes. And, as stated earlier, the legislative business of both the 
Senate and the House of Representatives is continued within the 
same term from the first session to the second. 85 That has not always 
been the case, however. The first terms of Congress followed the rule 
of the English Parliament that business unfinished in one session 
should not be continued by the next session. 86 Each session thus 
began with new business only. The first modification of this practice 
was made in 1818 when, in an effort better to utilize legislative time, 
the House of Representatives adopted a rule that bills not disposed 
of in the first session could be continued with the same status at the 
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
84. The Court in the Pocket Veto Case specifically rejected the contention that 
the end of the first session of a term of Congress may mark the termination of its 
power to reconsider return vetoes. It stated that although there may be "an interim 
adjournment of Congress at the end of the first session ... the legislative existence of 
the House in which the bill originated has not been terminated .... " 279 U.S. at 681. 
The Court thus believed that the crucial factor preventing return of a bill to its house 
of origin was the physical absence of its membership caused by the adjournment. 
"The House, not having been in session when the bill was delivered to the officer or 
agent, could neither have received the bill and objections at that time, nor have 
entered the objections upon its journal, nor have proceeded to reconsider the bill, as 
the Constitution requires .... " 279 U.S. at 684 (emphasis added). 
85. See text accompanying note 80 supra. 
86. See CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES 471 (1953). 
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second session.87 It was not until 1848 that this rule was amended to 
include the continuance of House bills that had been sent to the 
Senate and not until 1890 that the rule was finally amended to its 
present form. 88 Thus, consistent with the practice of noncontinuance 
of legislative business which existed at the time the Constitution was 
adopted, it can be argued that the framers specifically intended that 
the adjournment sine die of the first session of a term of Congress 
should deprive both houses of legal power to reconsider a vetoed bill 
at the next session of that term. That the Constitution does not 
specifically prohibit the Senate or House from amending their house-
keeping rules to allow a continuance of all other types of legislative 
business should in no way detract from the persuasiveness of the 
suggestion that a prohibition on the continuation of reconsideration 
of a vetoed bill from one session to the next was specifically intended 
An adjournment of the first session of a term of Congress would, 
then, as the Pocket Veto Case held, 89 "prevent" the return of a bill to 
the house in which it originated because neither house would have 
the power, upon reconvening, to reconsider the returned bill. 
IV. COLLATERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The conclusion that the President does not have the authority 
to pocket veto legislation when either or both houses have recessed 
·within a session of Congress has been reached solely from an exam-
ination of the Pocket Veto Case and Wright. There are, however, 
other sources that might aid in interpretating the pocket-veto provi-
sion. These include historical practice, the opinions of commentators, 
official documents, and related state court decisions. 
The view that the President may pocket veto a bill whenever 
the house in which the bill originated is not in actual session on 
the tenth day after the bill was presented to him has support in 
actual practice. Pocket vetoes during a recess within a session oc-
curred in the nineteenth century at least during the administra-
tions of Presidents Johnson, Harrison, and Cleveland.80 More re-
cently, Congress acquiesced in a pocket veto by President Truman 
during a two-month recess of the 1950 session91 and in pocket vetoes 
during recesses of shorter duration by Presidents Roosevelt, Eisen-
hower, and Johnson.92 
Additionally, attorneys general of the United States who have 
expressed an opinion on the issue have apparently been unanimous 
87. Id. 
88. See SENATE MANUAL, Standing Rule XXXII, at 43 (1967); CoNsrrnmoN, JEFFER• 
SON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Rule XXVI, at 471 (1953). 
89. 279 U.S. at 680, 691-92. 
90. See 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 277 (1943). 
91. Zinn, The Veto Power of the President, 12 F.R.D. 207, 237 (1951). 
92. See Rehnquist Letter, supra note 5, at S. 21819. 
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in their support of the expansive construction of the pocket-veto 
power represented by prior presidential practice. In what is perhaps 
the earliest official interpretation, Attorney General Devens advised 
President Hays that if Congress were to recess ten days after a bill 
was presented to the President so that the President could not re-
turn the bill directly to the originating house as an organized body, 
"the bill would not become a law .... [because] ... [t]here is no 
suggestion that he may return it to the Speaker, or Clerk, or any 
other officer of the House .... "93 This conclusion has since been 
concurred in by Attorneys General Miller in 1892,94 Sargent in 
1927,95 and Biddle in 1943.96 
Despite these supporting opinions by various attorneys general, 
the practice of allowing the President to pocket veto a bill when 
the house in which it originated is in a recess during a session of 
Congress should not be given great weight in defining the scope of 
the pocket-veto power. Custom does not estop the enforcement of 
the Constitution. An example of the proposition that a final deter-
mination of presidential power may be made that differs from his-
torical practice is the Supreme Court decision in Edwards v. United 
States.91 For nearly 150 years, it had been the practice of the 
President to go to the Capitol on the last day of each session in order 
to sign final bills that he intended to approve. This practice developed 
because of the almost universal belief that the President had no 
power to sign a bill after the sine die adjournment of a session or 
term of Congress.98 The Edwards case dispelled that belief, however, 
by holding that the President has ten days in which to sign a bill 
after its presentation to him even if Congress ends a session in the 
interim.99 
Indeed, the presidential exercise of the pocket-veto power during 
recesses within congressional sessions has not gone completely un-
challenged. In 1868, the Senate passed a bill regulating the return 
of bills from the President. It provided that the return of a bill to 
the Senate or House would be prevented by a "final adjournment 
of a session" of Congress but not by a recess within a session.100 The 
Senate also would have allowed the Secretary of_ the Senate and the 
93. See 20 OP. A'ITY. GEN. 503, 505-06 (1892). 
94. 20 OP. A'ITY. GEN. 507-08 (1892). 
95. Letter from Attorney General Sargent to President Coolidge, Jan. 31, 1927, 
quoted by Attorney General Biddle in 40 OP. A'ITY. GEN. 274, 278 (1943). 
96. 40 OP. A'ITY. GEN. 274 (1943). 
97. 286 U.S. 482 (1932). 
98. See Zinn, supra note 91, at 226. 
99. 286 U.S. at 492-94. 
100. S. 366, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868), cited in the Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 
655, 685 (1929). The passage of the bill seems clearly to indicate that the Senate was 
of the opinion that the constitutional language was sufficiently ambiguous to warrant 
clarification. For an argument that the Senate does have power to clarify constitutional 
provisions dealing with legislative process, see Zinn, supra note 91, at 218-20, 242-46. 
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Clerk of the House of Representatives to receive bills during a 
recess. The bill, however, was never reported out of the House 
Judiciary Committee.101 Some sixty years later the House Judiciary 
Committee expressed its agreement with the earlier Senate view of 
the pocket veto, by stating in a report to the full House that "the 
adjournment contemplated in the constitutional provision relating 
to presidential objections to bills and return thereof is the final 
adjournment of Congress, not an interim adjournment."102 
Legal commentators have also supported the view that a pocket 
veto is not appropriate during temporary recesses within a session 
of Congress.103 As early as 1833, Justice Story wrote that, in his 
opinion, the type of adjournment that would "render it impossible 
for the president to return [ a] bill" would be "a termination of the 
session" of a Congress.104 A similar sentiment was expressed in 1890 
by a commentator who analyzed the origin, development, and func-
tion of the veto power and concluded that the possibility of a pocket 
veto is created only by an adjournment at "the end of a session of 
Congress" since "the provision is plain."105 More recently, a report 
to the House Judiciary Committee expressed the belief that the 
Wright decision indicates "a trend of reasoning which may ulti-
mately recognize that an interim adjournment [within a session] does 
not prevent the return of a bill."106 The author noted the new 
presidential practice of preparing memoranda expounding the rea-
sons for pocket vetoes and the transmission of these messages to 
Congress for incorporation into the legislative journals. The report 
concluded that, in light of this practice, there is "no logical reason 
why the [pocket-vetoed] bill should not be eligible for reconsidera-
tion."107 The preparation of a memorandum explaining the substan-
101. See the Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 687 (1929). 
102. 68 CONG. REc. pt. 5, at 4933 (1927). 
103. The sole opinion discovered to the contrary was e.xpressed in a te.xtbook on 
legislation. It was stated that · 
the theory followed by Chief Justice Hughes in the Wright case would seem to 
compel a conclusion that if both houses by mutual consent recess for more than 
three days that would be an adjournment of "the Congress" which would constitute 
the sort of adjournment contemplated by the pocket veto clause. 
H. READ, J. McDONALD &: J. FORDHAM, LEGISLATION 667 (1959). No reasoning was 
expressed to support this conclusion, however. 
104. 2 J. STORY, COl',lllIENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 888 
(1st ed. 1833). 
105. E. MASON, THE VETO POWER 113 (1890). 
106. Zinn, supra note 91, at 237. 
107. Id. at 238. To resolve the controversy whether a recess by one or both houses 
within a session of Congress is an adjournment which prevents the return of a dis• 
approved bill, the report proposes that the Congress avail itself of its power to enact 
regulatory legislation in this field. The recommended legislation would define adjourn-
ment as "an adjournment sine die by both the Senate and the House of Representatives 
terminating a session of the Congress." Id. at 243. It is believed that such a law would 
"clear up the confusion from the Pocket Veto and the Wright cases and is in keeping 
with a reasonable interpretation of the constitutional intent." Id. at 245. 
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tive reasons for which a bill has been pocket vetoed indicates that the 
President has had sufficient time to consider the bill's merits and 
thus contradicts the rationale of the Pocket Veto Case that pocket 
vetoes should be permitted because an adjournment restricts the 
President's ability to consider bills and to "formulate adequately the 
objections which should receive the consideration of Congress."108 
The final collateral source that might aid in interpreting the 
pocket-veto provision is state court decisions. The early state consti-
tutional provisions permitting a pocket veto were quite similar to the 
Federal Constitution's provision.109 Generally, the number of days 
allowed the governor to return the bill was the sole difference be-
tween the federal and state provisions.110 The great majority of state 
supreme court decisions construing the respective pocket-veto pro-
visions held that the type of adjournment that will prevent a return, 
and thus permit a pocket veto, is only a sine die adjournment of a 
session or a term.111 Several of these state cases also held that a return 
of a vetoed bill to an agent of the house in which the bill originated 
is permissible.112 It is notable that several of these holdings have 
now been codified in state constitutional provisions, which explicitly 
limit the pocket veto to sine die adjournments.113 
V. CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the authorities that have grappled with the pocket-
veto provision reveals that there is no significant reason that the 
return of a disapproved bill cannot be made to the house of origin 
108. 279 U.S. at 678. 
109. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. 4, § II (1876); WIS. CONST. art. v, § 10. 
110. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 11 (three days); WIS. CONST. art. v, § 10 
(six days). 
Ill. State supreme court opinions that have held that a recess within a legislative 
session does not allow the governor to pocket veto a bill are chronologically as follows: 
Opinion of the Justices, 3 Mass. 567 (1791); The Soldiers' Voting Bill, 45 N.H. 607 
(1864); Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189 (1870); Corwin v. Comptroller Gen., 6 S.C. 
390 (1875); Miller v. Hurford, 11 Neb. 377, 9 N.W. 477 (1881); Hequembourg v. City 
of Dunkirk, 56 N.Y. Sup. 550, 2 N.Y.S. 447 (1888); State ex rel. State Pharmaceutical 
Assn. v. Michel, 52 La. Ann. 936, 27 S. 565 (1900); Johnson City v. Tennessee Eastern 
Elcc. Co., 133 Tenn. 632, 182 S.W. 587 (1915); Municipality of Quebradillas v. Executive 
Secretary, 27 P.R.R. 138 (Puerto Rico 1919); State ex rel. Putnam v. Holm, 172 Minn. 
162, 215 N.W. 200 (1927); Wood v. State Adm. Bd., 255 Mich. 220, 238 N.W. 16 (1931); 
State ex rel. Sullivan v. Damman, 221 Wis. 551, 267 N.W. 433 (1936); Hawaiian Airlines 
v. Public Util. Commn., 43 Hawaii 216 (1959). Contra, In re Public Util. Bd., 83 N.J.L. 
303, 84 A. 704 (1912); Opinion of the Justices, 54 Del. 209, 175 A.2d 405 (1961). See also 
State ex rel. Corbett v. Town of South Nonvalk, 77 _Conn. 257, 58 A. 759 (1904). 
112. The Soldiers' Voting Bill, 45 N.H. 607, 609-10 (1864); Harpending v. Haight, 
39 Cal. 189, 203, 205 (1870); Convin v. Comptroller Gen., 6 S.C. 390, 398 (1875); State 
ex rel. State Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Michel, 52 La. Ann. 936, 941, 27 S. 565, 567 (1900); 
Johnson City v. Tennessee Eastern Elec. Co., 133 Tenn. 632, 643, 182 S.W. 587, 590 
(1915); State ex rel. Putnam v. Holm, 172 Minn. 162, 169-70, 215 N.W. 200, 203 (1927); 
Wood v. State Adm. Bd., 255 Mich. 220, 231, 238 N.W. 16, 31 (1931); State ex rel. 
Sullivan v. Damman, 221 Wis. 551, 560, 267 N.W. 433, 437 (1936). 
113. See, e.g., HAWAll CONST. art. III, § 17; MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 11. 
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during a recess of any length within a session of Congress. The consti-
tutional language that indicates that the return must be made "to 
the House" does not have to be construed as strictly as some courts 
have required. Support for this assertion is found in the fact that 
courts have been more liberal in interpreting otl1er constitutional 
provisions. For example, the same paragraph in the Constitution that 
contains the pocket-veto provision requires that a bill after passing 
both houses of Congress be presented "to the President."114 It has 
long been the practice that delivery to the White House in the 
President's absence is regarded as an effective presentation.m If the 
words "the President" can be construed to mean one of his aides, 
the same construction can certainly be given to the words "the 
House." It is, after all, a Constitution that is being expounded.110 
What emerges from a study of the pocket-veto provision is the 
conclusion that the provision was inserted in the Constitution to 
safeguard the right of the President to have sufficient time to give 
all bills careful examination and to return those which he disap-
proves. So long as the President is accorded a full ten days before 
he must return a disapproved bill to its house of origin, this right 
is not abridged. If an agent of the house of origin is permitted to 
accept the return of a bill, it becomes irrelevant that on the tenth 
day after the President has received a bill either or both houses are 
in a recess of more than three days. The right of Congress to over-
ride a presidential veto is too important to be subordinated to 
an alleged mandate that a vetoed bill must be reconsidered im-
mediately. It would be a severe distortion of the intended distribu-
tion of governmental powers if, under the guise of protecting the 
constitutional right to a full ten days to consider a bill, the Presi-
dent acquires an absolute veto power because of the fortuitous cir-
cumstance of an untimely congressional recess. A framework of checks 
and balances should not be held to rest on such niceties. An inter-
pretation of the pocket-veto clause that allows only a sine die ad-
journment of a session or term of Congress to prevent the return of 
a bill would protect both presidential and congressional prerogatives 
in the making of law.117 Such an interpretation would mean that 
President Nixon was without the constitutional power to pocket veto 
the Family Practice of Medicine Act. That Act should now be law 
"in like Manner as if he had signed it." 
114. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
115. See Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 590 (1937). Cf. Eber Bros. Wine &: 
Liquor Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624, 629 (Ct. Cl. 1964). 
116. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (Marshall, J.). 
117. Bills embodying such an interpretation of the pocket-veto clause have been 
introduced by Senator Ervin and Representatives Celler and McCulloch. S. 1642, 92d 
Cong., 1st Scss. (1971); H.R. 6225, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
